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I.  Introduction 
Intergovernmental fiscal relations (IGFR) within a state is concerned with 
how state and local governments assign revenue sources and divide expenditure 
responsibilities, with how oversight of local governments by the state is conducted, 
and with the system of intergovernmental grants.  The system of fiscal federalism in 
the United States is often hailed as one of the oldest decentralized fiscal system in the 
world.  But not only are the intergovernmental fiscal relations that define the system 
unique to the U.S., each state has its own set of relationships between the state and 
sub-state governments, such as counties, cities, townships, school systems, and 
special districts.   
This report provides a detailed account of the system of state and local fiscal 
relations in Georgia.  The report surveys current practices, identifies significant 
trends in revenue and expenditure assignment, discusses patterns of 
intergovernmental grants, and identifies issues that affect intergovernmental fiscal 
relations (such as income distribution, demographic change, constitutional challenges 
to tax legislation, etc.).  By highlighting current practice, we can shed light on 
practices that may be serving Georgia particularly well and those that might need 
reform. 
The report proceeds as follows.  The next section provides an overview of the 
state-local governmental structure in Georgia.  Section III provides a summary of the 
legal basis of governance in Georgia.  In Sections IV–VI, we present the details of the 
fiscal system in the state, considering expenditures, taxes, and intergovernmental 
grants, respectively.  We then describe the landscape of the IGFR system in Georgia, 
providing in Section VII information on the state’s demographics, economy, and 
politics, pointing out how these affect intergovernmental fiscal relations. A 
concluding section finalizes the report. 
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II.  State - Local Governmental Structure in Georgia 
Each Georgian receives public services from at least four governments: the 
federal government, state government, a county government, and a school district.  In 
addition, many residents receive services from a municipal government and from one 
or more special-purpose districts.   
Each type of local government has a particular purpose.  County governments 
were created as extensions of state government.  They are responsible for such 
functions as record keeping (for example, the recording of deeds), for public health, 
for welfare, and for courts and related functions that enforce state laws.  Municipal 
governments are responsible for providing other services that citizens desire, for 
example, parks, police, water and sewer systems, zoning, trash removal, etc.  
However, since 1972 county governments in Georgia have been authorized by the 
Georgia Constitution to provide the same services that municipalities can provide, but 
counties provide those services in the unincorporated areas of the county, i.e., outside 
the boundaries of municipalities.  Primary and secondary education is, according to 
the State Constitution, the responsibility of State government, but local school 
districts are given the responsibility for delivering education.  In addition, special 
purpose districts, for example, the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority 
(MARTA) and hospital authorities, have been created to provide special services. 
 
A.  Number of Governments 
In 2002, there were 87,576 governmental units in the United States (Table 1).  
In addition to the Federal Government and the 50 state governments, there were 
87,525 units of local government. Of these, 38,967 are general purpose local 
governments — 3,034 county governments and 35,933 non-county general purpose 
governments, i.e., municipalities, villages, and townships. The remainder, which is 
more than half the total number, includes 13,506 local school district governments 
and 35,052 special purpose districts.  Special purpose districts are independent 
governmental units created for a special purpose.  They have substantial fiscal 
independence and have administrative independence from general purpose  
governments.     Local     school     districts     are     a     type    of     special    purpose  
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TABLE 1. STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT ENTITIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
GEORGIA, 2002 
 United States Georgia 
States 
Local 
    General Purpose 
         County 
         Non-county 
    Special Purpose 
         School Districts 
         Special Districts 
50 
87,525 
38,967 
3,034 
35,933 
48,558 
15,014 
35,052 
1 
1448 
687 
159 
528 
761 
180 
581 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002 Census of Governments. 
 
government, but because of their importance they are grouped into a separate 
category. 
The number of governments in the U.S. declined from the mid-1950s through 
the early part of the 1970s due mainly to school system consolidations (Figure 1).  
Since 1972, the growth in governments in the United States has been fueled by the 
creation of special districts. 
The state of Georgia is structured in a similar manner.  As of 2002, Georgia 
had 159 county governments (including consolidated city-county governments), 528 
municipal governments, 180 local school districts, and 581 special districts (Table 1).  
Unlike many other states, Georgia does not have township or village designations for 
local general purpose governments.  
Over the past 50 years, the total number of local governments in Georgia 
increased due to the growth in special districts, from 154 in 1952 to 581 in 2002 
(Figure 2).  There were few changes in the number of other local governments.  The 
number of school systems in Georgia fell as small city school districts merged with 
county systems; in 1962 there were 196 school districts in Georgia while currently 
there are 180 school districts.  There was an increase in the number of municipalities 
between 1952 and 1962, but the number has since declined, from 561 in 1962 to 528 
in 2002.1  There were four consolidations of city and counties (see below).  
 
 
                                                 
1 In 1993, Georgia passed legislation that required that cities provide a minimum number of 
services.  As a result several cities were de-incorporated. 
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FIGURE 1.  NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT UNITS, U.S. 
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FIGURE 2.  GOVERNMENT UNITS, GEORGIA 
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Relative to its neighboring states, on a per capita basis, Georgia has a large 
number of governments.  Georgia has 19.1 governments for every 100,000 residents.  
Comparatively, Alabama has 15.1 governments for every 100,000 residents; South 
Carolina, 11.5; Tennessee, 16.2; and Florida, which has 4.1 governments for every 
100,000 residents.  The national average is 10.8; nearly half that of Georgia.   
That Georgia’s counties are smaller than average for the country can be seen 
from Table 2, which presents the distribution of counties by population size for the 
United States and for Georgia.  Georgia has a smaller percentage of counties in the 
larger population size and a larger percentage in the smallest population size.   
 Georgia’s municipalities are also smaller than average for the country.  Table 
3 presents the distribution of municipalities by population size for the United States 
and for Georgia.  Again, Georgia has a smaller percentage of municipalities in the 
larger population size and a larger percentage in the smallest population size.  There 
is an average of 3.3 municipalities in each county in Georgia.  Gwinnett County has 
the most at 11, while Echols County has no municipalities.  Thirty-four counties have 
only one municipality.   
 
TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF COUNTIES BY POPULATION SIZE 
 ------------------------------------Population----------------------------------- 
 500,000  
and more 
100,000-
499,000 
 
25,000-99,000 
Less than 
25,000 
United States 3.0% 12.6% 33.6% 50.8% 
Georgia 2.5% 6.3% 29.6% 61.6% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002 Census of Governments. 
 
 
TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF MUNICIPALITIES BY POPULATION SIZE 
 ------------------------------------Population----------------------------------- 
 100,000  
and more 
 
25,000-99,000 
 
5,000-24,999 
Less than  
5,000 
United States 1.2% 5.2% 15.8% 77.8% 
Georgia 0.9% 2.8% 15.6% 80.6% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002 Census of Governments.  
 
Of the 581 special purpose districts in Georgia, 483 are single purpose.  Of 
these single purpose districts, there are 201 districts that are responsible for housing 
and community development, 134 that provide hospital and other health services, 54 
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that focus on environmental issues including soil and water conservation, 41 that 
operate utilities, and 25 that provide airports.  The purposes for the other 28 districts 
include a variety of functions, including fire protection and industrial development. 
Is this system of overlapping layers of government an appropriate design?  
Are the number and size of local governments efficient?  Are public services 
provided at the appropriate governmental level?  There is a substantial literature that 
addresses these questions, and although it is well beyond the scope of this report to 
answer these questions for Georgia, it is useful to point out that there are four basic 
concepts or principles that at least help frame the answers to these questions.   
The first principle, the “correspondence principle,” suggests that the 
geographic size of a governmental entity should correspond to the area over which 
the benefits of the public services provided are enjoyed.  Based on this principle, 
economists believe that, in general, expenditures on certain services are better left up 
to the higher level of government and others to the lower levels of government.  How 
is that distinction made?  It is based on the notion that if substantial benefits of a 
public service would spill over to residents of other jurisdictions, then that public 
service is better handled by a higher level of government.  For example, national 
defense is thought to generate substantial positive benefits for the entire country.  If 
each city were in charge of its own national defense, as a group they would likely not 
produce sufficient national defense to satisfy the entire nation.  However, there are 
few services that are as clear-cut as to which level of government should be 
responsible for its provision.  
The second principle is that a jurisdiction should be of a size (area and 
population) that minimizes the cost per capita of providing public services.  It is 
commonly thought that there are economies of population size in the provision of 
public services.  This implies that it is cheaper to produce many public services for 
larger populations.  Therefore, larger and fewer governments are more cost efficient.  
However, there is not much empirical evidence that supports this assumption, due in 
part to the difficulties of measuring production processes for public services.    
The third principle is that governments should satisfy citizens’ demand for 
public services.  This principle suggests that if there are differences in the preferences 
among individuals regarding the level and mix of public services, then individuals 
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need to be given a choice over the mix of public services they receive and pay for.  
The greater is the variation in preferences, the greater the importance of having a 
large number of local governments from which to choose.  Related to this principle is 
the belief that lower levels of government are better able to discern the true needs and 
wants of their constituents.  It would be tough for the state General Assembly to 
know how the citizens in the city of Valdosta differ from those in Harrelson County 
in terms of their preferences for, say, trash collection, or recreational activities.  Also, 
the population of a small community may be more homogenous and therefore their 
residents may all demand similar types of public services, while large communities 
may have a population that is more diverse in its preferences for the level and mix of 
public services.   
Finally, issues of equity arise if inter-governmental disparities exist among 
governments in terms of their ability to provide services.  It would seem unfair that 
two equivalent households living in different jurisdictions could pay the same taxes, 
but receive substantially different level of services because one jurisdiction generates 
much less revenue.  
Each of these four principles has some bearing on the decision about the 
number of jurisdictions, and consequently the size of each.  However, each of the 
principles could suggest something different about the desirable number of 
jurisdictions—the economies of scale argument calling for larger jurisdiction, while 
the meeting of public’s demand argument suggests smaller jurisdictions.  Thus, the 
choice of number of local governments and the assignment of responsibility for 
service delivery requires making trade-offs between the four principles.  The 
principles, however, do provide a reasonable way to evaluate the trade-offs when 
considering alternative sizes of government in Georgia. 
  
B.  City/County Consolidation 
While Georgia has a relatively large number of governments, provisions exist 
in the Constitution to change the status of a jurisdiction.  Over time several small 
municipalities have disbanded, and as a result the county has assumed responsibility 
for the services that were being provided by the municipality.  But there have also 
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been efforts at formal consolidations of municipalities and counties.  Four counties in 
Georgia have merged with the county seat city government in an apparent effort to 
streamline costs and government operations.  Despite attempts by several counties, 
this has been successful only in Columbus-Muscogee County in 1971, Athens-Clarke 
County in 1991, Augusta-Richmond County in 1995, and Cusseta-Chattahoochee 
County in 2003.  This has not happened without turbulence, as taxpayers have feared 
rising tax rates and the overlapping of offices, such as the city police and county 
sheriff’s departments.  
 Among the issues that arise in discussion of consolidations is concern by 
government employees that they will lose their jobs.  For Muscogee County and the 
City of Columbus all city and county government employees were guaranteed that 
their job would not be cut, although the possibility of reassignment remained, which 
stirred frustration among employees.  Between 1971 and 1985, the total number of 
employees decreased from 1,865 to 1,853 while the county began to offer new 
services.  
 Opposition to city/county proposals arise from residents of both the 
unincorporated areas and the municipalities.  Residents in unincorporated areas may 
fear that taxes will increase in order to finance the new government and that the 
government that represented them will have to tackle the problems and burdens of the 
other government.  However, the rationale for consolidating city and county 
governments is the same as that of a vertical merger – administrative costs can be 
saved and streamlined by combining government operations.  For example, the city 
police can specialize in patrolling streets while the sheriff’s department would 
concentrate on running the jail and court systems.   
 
C.  County Consolidation 
 The first 8 counties in Georgia were established in February 1777 and the last 
5 counties to be formed were established in November 1920.  Since 1932, when 
Milton and Campbell counties were merged with Fulton County, the number of 
counties has remained at 159.  However, there have been proposals made to 
consolidate Georgia’s 159 counties.  Only one state, Texas, has more counties than 
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Georgia, but Georgia ranks 21st in land area, while Texas is the second largest state, 
suggesting that the number of counties in Texas may be more defensible on the 
grounds of service delivery.  One, perhaps apocryphal, explanation for the size of 
Georgia’s counties is that they were designed so county seats were no more than a 
day’s horse buggy ride from any part of the county.  Another explanation has it that 
cities lobbied for many counties because they saw being a county seat as an economic 
generator.  
 The Georgia Constitution limits the number of counties to no more than 159.  
Furthermore, the Constitution requires that changes in county boundaries (including 
consolidation of counties) must be approved by the voters in all affected counties.2  
 In 1986, the Georgia General Assembly proposed consolidating 48 of the 
least-populated counties into the larger 111 counties.  Supporters of the legislation 
argued that county consolidation would increase government efficiency by decreasing 
the number of governmental units, and consequently saving tax dollars by increasing 
economies of scale.  Also, the poorer counties could pool their resources with the 
more affluent one. 
 However, the proposal had its opponents.  Some potentially affected residents 
had a strong sense of pride in their home county, and felt that their identity would be 
threatened by having their county dissolved into a larger county.  Also, the residents 
in the larger counties to be merged did not want to be burdened with the smaller 
county’s debts and fiscal problems.  In the end, there was no consolidation of these 
counties.   
 
D.  Annexations 
Unlike consolidations, municipal annexations in Georgia have been relatively 
common and have changed the face of governance in the state.  From 1980 to 1990, 
there were 5,636 annexations in the state; from 1990-1998, there were 3,398 
(Steinbauer et al, 2002).  Municipalities annex land for a variety of reasons, for 
example, to expand their commercial property tax base.  However, annexation allows 
municipalities to provide public services to areas of the county that become more 
                                                 
2 Legislation has been introduced in the General Assembly to recreate Milton County. 
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developed and thus have a need for “urban” services such as police, parks, etc.  Until 
counties were granted authority to provide these services, annexation (or the creation 
of new municipalities) was the principal way that new residential development 
outside the municipality was provided public services.  Thus, annexation was a way 
to reduce duplication of public service providers and possibly reduce the cost of 
service delivery.  
Annexation is one way of converting unincorporated areas to incorporated 
areas.  But another way is to form new municipalities.  Since 1980, there have been 
five new cities formed in Georgia.  Register in Bulloch County was incorporated in 
1982 and Graham in Appling County was incorporated in 1991.  Recently Sandy 
Springs, Johns Creek, and Milton, all in north Fulton County, were incorporated.  In 
2007, referenda will be held regarding the possible incorporation of two 
municipalities in south Fulton County.  
The rights and responsibilities of local governments are largely governed by 
the State Constitution and State statutes.  The next section presents the legal setting 
for local governments in Georgia, which is important background for understanding 
the system of intergovernmental relations in the state.   The legal authority granted to 
local governments determines the ability of governments to respond to their 
constituencies. 
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III.  Legal Status of Local Governments 
In this section we focus on the legal structure for counties and municipalities 
and its implications for intergovernmental fiscal relations in Georgia.  The legal 
structure for local school systems is discussed at the end of the section. 
In Georgia, there are two types of general purpose local governments, 
counties and municipalities.  Counties and municipalities are political subdivisions of 
the state, and thus can only act on powers granted to them by the state Constitution 
(Section II of Article IX) and by state statutes.  This is in contrast to the relatively 
unlimited autonomy of state governments under the U.S. Constitution, which 
provides states with all powers not expressly granted to the federal government by the 
U.S. Constitution.   
The general powers of local governments, referred to as home rule, are 
determined by the Georgia Constitution and state statues, which set the legal 
framework for the various levels of government.  Home rule authority differs 
between counties and cities and so we discuss each in turn.  Home rule powers are 
important because the courts have ruled that if a local government has not been 
granted a power, it cannot act as if it did.  
 
A.  Home Rule for Counties 
 Home rule authority for counties is largely specified in the Georgia 
Constitution.  The Constitution (IX, §II ¶1 (a)) provides the governing authority of 
each county with legislative power to adopt reasonable legislation, provided that it is 
consistent with the Constitution, and to regulate its property, affairs, and local 
government.  The county government may not pass a statute that restricts the 
authority of the Georgia General Assembly to broaden or limit the power of local 
laws passed by the counties.  However, the General Assembly cannot pass laws that 
supersede or modify actions taken by the county government under the county’s own 
authority to do so.   
In 1972, Georgia passed Amendment 19 of the Constitution, which granted 
counties the authority to provide the same set of services to the unincorporated area 
of the county that municipalities can provide within municipalities. These services 
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are: fire and police protection, garbage/solid waste disposal, public health facilities, 
animal control, local street and road construction, parks and recreational areas, 
sewage collection and treatment facilities, water treatment, public housing authorities, 
public transportation, libraries, parking facilities, building codes, air quality control, 
and benefits packages for local government employees.  In addition, general state law 
allows counties to adopt ordinances to protect the public health, safety and welfare of 
the unincorporated area of the county.  These provisions allow counties to essentially 
act as municipalities within the unincorporated area of the county.  Counties are 
allowed, but not required, to create service districts within unincorporated areas for 
the provision of services such as police and fire protection.  The Constitution does 
prohibit a county from exercising these powers inside the city limits of a municipality 
without a contract, and vice versa. 
 Counties have constitutionally used home rule power (Paragraph I, Section II, 
Article IX) to amend their own laws.  Ordinances can be adopted, amended, or 
repealed by the county governing body, or through public referendum.  In the later 
case, a petition may be filed with the judge of the county probate court with 
signatures of at least 25 percent of the county’s electors for counties with a 
population of less than 5,000, 20 percent in counties with between 5,000 and 50,000 
people, and 10 percent for counties with a population over 50,000.  The validity of 
the petition is verified by the probate judge, and should it be approved, the judge will 
set a date for the election.  
Powers granted to counties are not considered to extend to the following: 
actions affecting any county elective office; actions affecting procedure for the 
election or compensation of the governing county authority; defining any criminal 
offense or punishment; any form of taxation beyond that authorized by law or the 
Constitution; action affecting the exercise of the power of eminent domain; actions 
affecting the court system; actions affecting the public school system; or actions 
extending regulation activity reserved to the Georgia Public Service Commission.   
The Constitution goes to great length to specify that the power of county 
commissioners is strictly limited by the Constitution to only those powers granted to 
them.  Because the home rule provision for counties specifically prohibits any 
attempt by a local governing authority to change or interfere with the operation of 
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provisions of general law, it limits legislative actions by the board of commissioners 
on matters for which no provision has been made by local or general law.  
Authorities, on the other hand, must demonstrate that they are not operating arms of 
county or municipal governments and thus are not subject to the same home rule 
provisions.   
 Recent ratings of home rule list Georgia as one of nine “weak” home rule 
states (Geon and Turnbull, 2006).  This suggests that Georgia’s counties have less 
authority than counties in several other states.  Louisiana and South Carolina are the 
closest neighbors that are classified as strong home rule states. 
 
B.  Home Rule for Municipalities 
Unlike counties, home rule for municipalities is provided through legislation, 
not through the Constitution.  The Constitution (IX, §II, ¶II) specifies that the 
General Assembly has the authority to provide for the self-government of 
municipalities.  Thus, municipal governments have no Constitutional home rule 
authority.  The intent of the Constitutional provision is to allow the General 
Assembly to adopt legislation that permits municipal governments to deal with local 
issues without action of the General Assembly.   
The courts have ruled that municipal corporations in Georgia can exercise 
only those powers that are expressed in words, that can be necessarily or fairly 
implied, or that are essential (not just convenient) to the declared objects of the 
corporation.  Municipal home rule powers are granted through general law and 
municipal charters, which are specific to each municipality and must be approved by 
the General Assembly. 
The general powers granted to municipal governments by the General 
Assembly are set out in chapters 34 and 35 of Title 36 of the Georgia code.  Chapter 
34 provides authority regarding the administration of the municipal government, 
including establishing offices, providing merit systems, contracting for services, 
granting franchises, constructing water and sewage systems, and issuing financial 
obligations.   
Chapter 35 provides that municipalities can adopt ordinance, rules, and 
regulations relating to its property, affairs and local government.  (For counties, this 
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authority is granted by the Constitution.)  In addition, Chapter 35 allows 
municipalities to set compensation of employees and elected officials, to reapportion, 
and to amend their charter, subject to some limitations.  Municipalities cannot: 
change the composition or form of or procedure for electing its governing body; 
define an offense which is already a criminal offense or impose a sentence in excess 
of 6 months or $1,000; adopt a tax that is not otherwise authorized; affect the exercise 
of the power of eminent domain; affect the court system; affect an independent public 
school system; extend regulation activity reserved to the Georgia Public Service 
Commission.  Annexation is also included in the rights granted to cities.  
Municipalities cannot grant themselves new powers—they can only receive 
and retain powers granted to them by the General Assembly.  While the Constitution 
does not limit the power of the General Assembly to legislate to municipalities, it 
grants power to delegate those responsibilities that are best handled by municipalities, 
such as trash collection and park/recreation services.  Furthermore, the Constitution is 
flexible in granting the power to the General Assembly in terms of granting new city 
charters – it provides for no uniform way upon which this act can be accomplish.  
The Constitution also grants the power to the General Assembly to revoke a city or 
county’s charter.   
The potential for overlap and duplication in service delivery between counties 
and municipalities was addressed in 1997 when the Georgia General Assembly 
passed HB 489, the Service Delivery Strategy Act.  The bill was developed through 
negotiation between the Association of County Commissioners of Georgia and the 
Georgia Municipal Association.3  The intent of the legislation is to increase local 
cooperation in service delivery and make the counties and cities accountable to the 
state for providing “a more rational approach to allocating delivery and funding” 
(Department of Community Affairs, 1998). 
Municipalities can change size through annexation.  There are three 
approaches to annexation, beyond local acts of the General Assembly.  The “100 
percent method” holds that municipal governments may annex adjacent 
unincorporated land “upon the written and signed applications of all owners of the 
property proposed to be annexed” (Steinbauer et al, 2002, page 36).  The annexation 
                                                 
3  See:  http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/1997_98/house/hinfo/wrap_7.htm 
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laws were supplements in 1966 so that municipalities with a population of at least 
200 could annex unincorporated land if: the application for annexation were signed 
by at least 60 percent of owners of property to be annexed, at least 60 percent of the 
electors sign the application, a plan was submitted for services in the area to be 
annexed, and a public hearing was held.  This second method of annexation is 
referred to as the “60 percent method.”  A third method for annexation was added in 
1970, the “resolution and referendum method”.  As the name suggests, this method 
requires the municipality to pass a resolution and then hold a referendum in the area 
proposed to be annexed.  Steinbauer, et al. (2002) report that this is the most 
complicated means of annexation and is therefore not often used. 
The annexation planning, coupled with HB 489, could provide a means to 
further encourage efficiency in public service provision, as outlined by Steinbauer, et 
al. based on the experiences of other states.  They suggest that a long-term plan that 
incorporates future annexation plans into the service delivery agreements and 
streamlines the annexation process for such planned changes could enhance long-
term planning and result in less ad hoc decisions regarding annexation (and, 
potentially, service delivery).  A criticism of such a plan, however, is that it may be 
too difficult to develop a long-term plan for annexation that is actually viable under a 
referendum system.    
 
C.  Authority of Local School Systems 
 Local schools systems are responsible for providing elementary and 
secondary education, but cannot provide any other public service.  The authority and 
responsibilities of local schools systems, which are spelled out in the Quality Basic 
Education Act, are highly circumscribed.  
   
D.  Power of Taxation  
 The powers of taxation are referenced in Article VII, Section I of the 
Constitution.  The right to control taxation is under the exclusive authority of the 
State, and the State may not transfer that right elsewhere, or amend it in any way.  
Furthermore, a municipality’s right to tax can only be conferred through a statute or 
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directly by the Constitution. This is in stark contrast to the taxing authority outlined 
in the U.S. Constitution, where the only major limitations on the taxing powers of the 
state relate to interstate commerce and custom duties. 
  The only limitation on taxation specified in the State Constitution is that the 
State government may not levy ad valorem taxes on tangible property that exceed 
one-fourth of a mill.  The purpose of this restriction was to withdraw the state from 
the use of ad valorem taxes, and relegate this tax to local governments.  
 Local governments are allowed to levy a property tax.  The basis of the 
property tax is generally fair market value, and all counties are required to use that 
basis.4  However, the values of homestead exemptions are set by local legislation and 
thus differ across local governments.  There are no state mandated restrictions on 
property taxes, either in the rate or levy, except for county school systems.  For 
county school systems, but not independent systems, the Constitution specifies a 
maximum property tax rate of 20 mills. 
 Local governments are allowed to adopt various sales and use taxes, all of 
which are set at 1 percent, are set countywide, with one exception as noted below, 
and must be adopted by referendum.  With the exception of  Local Option Sales 
Taxes enacted after October 1, 1996, the base of the local sales taxes include food for 
home consumption, while the state sales tax exempts food for home consumption.5  
The revenue from the Local Option Sales Tax (LOST) is split between the county and 
municipal governments based on a distribution that is negotiated every 10 years.  The 
revenue is used for property tax reduction and general services.   
The Special Purpose Local Option Sales Tax (SPLOST) can be used for 
capital projects of the county and municipality and can be imposed for up to 5 years, 
but can be renewed.  The county and municipalities must confer over the projects, but 
the county government does not have to include the municipal projects in the list of 
projects eligible for funding.  The Education Special Purpose Local Option Sales Tax 
(EDLOST) is used by local school districts for capital improvements or debt 
reduction.  Two counties have imposed a Homestead Option Sales Tax (HOST); at 
                                                 
4 Note that Muscogee County allows homesteaded property to be taxed on the basis of the sales 
price with no adjustment for changes in value over time until a subsequent sale. 
5 Local sales taxes are also levied on sales of natural gas used for production of electricity, which 
is exempt at the state level. 
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least 80 percent of the HOST revenue must be used to fund increased homestead 
exemptions.  Two counties have a local sales tax used to fund MARTA.  The City of 
Atlanta has the only non-countywide local sales tax.6  As of January 1, 2007, 154 
counties had a LOST, 153 had a SPLOST, 153 had an EDLOST, and two had a 
HOST and two had a MARTA tax.  One county had a regular one percent sales tax. 
 There is legislative authority for local governments to adopt a 1 percent local 
income tax.  However, a county cannot have both a local sales tax and a local income 
tax, and the referendum for the local income tax requires at least a 50 percent voter 
turnout in a referendum that must being held in the first six months of the year.  
Consequently, no county has attempted to adopt it.  
 Municipal and county governments are authorized to impose an occupation 
tax.  This tax is levied on entities engaged in an occupation, profession or businesses.  
The tax can be based on the number of employees or gross receipts.  The tax rate can 
differ across entities based on national profitability ratios.   
 Municipal and county governments are also authorized to impose excise taxes 
on hotel and motel rooms and rental vehicles, although the revenue must be used for 
economic development, tourism or convention, recreation or sports facilities.  In 
addition, municipal and county governments can levy taxes on alcoholic beverages, 
although the state limits the tax rates that can be imposed.  Local governments are 
prohibited from imposing taxes on employment, or a tax or fee on airlines passengers. 
 This overview of the legal structure of local government in Georgia 
demonstrates that the county and municipalities in the state are afforded some 
flexibility in terms of consolidation and annexation.  At the same time, the state 
maintains a relatively active hand (legally) in identifying the political and fiscal 
parameters under which the local governments work.  We turn now to a more detailed 
discussion of the fiscal side of the intergovernmental story in Georgia.  
 
                                                 
6 The base for the City of Atlanta sales tax exempts some goods taxed by the state. 
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IV.  Expenditures 
Intergovernmental fiscal relations are made real in terms of which level of 
government is responsible for expenditures, the assignment of revenue sources, and 
intergovernmental grants.  In this section we focus on expenditures, while revenue 
and grants are considered in the two subsequent sections.  The discussion provides 
insight into the level and structure of decentralization in the state. 
The intergovernmental issue of expenditures is concerned with which level of 
government, state or local, is responsible for delivering which types of public 
services.  A distinction is made between the financing of the public services and the 
direct provision of public services.  For example, the state provides grants to local 
school districts, and therefore spends a substantial amount of money on K-12 
education.  However, it is the local school district that actually provides or delivers 
the education to the students.  Total expenditures include spending on grants, while 
direct expenditures consider only the direct provision of public services.   
Since our interest is with the delivery of service we consider the share of state 
and local direct expenditures made by the state government. The basic issue 
regarding expenditures is the allocation of responsibility for service provision, as 
measured by the share of state and local expenditures accounted for by state 
government.  The greater this share, the more centralized the decision making on 
public services.  Georgia has settled on a de facto distribution of expenditure 
responsibilities.   
While the principles set out in the previous section provide some help in 
thinking about which public services should be provided by the state and which 
should be provided by local governments, there is substantial room for debate.  Those 
principles suggest that expenditures that have impacts over a wide area are best 
handled by a higher level of government.  Those expenditures that serve a relatively 
small area with little spillover to other jurisdictions are best handled at a very “local” 
level.  Within this framework, there is much subjectivity to determining the “correct” 
distribution of expenditure responsibilities.  Thus, we find substantial variation across 
states in the state share of direct expenditures; the share varies from 35.5 percent in 
Nevada to 78.2 percent in Hawaii.   
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Table 4 shows the state share of direct expenditures made by state and local 
governments for Georgia and for the United States for 1991-92 and 2003-04.  For 
comparison we also show the state share of total expenditures.  As can be seen, the 
state share of direct expenditures is slightly lower in Georgia than for the United 
States, but the state share increased over the decade for both Georgia and the United 
States.  A similar pattern exists for total expenditures, although the state share of total 
expenditures is larger than for direct expenditures.  This is to be expected since the 
state provides substantial funding for K-12 education (which is part of total 
expenditures), although it does not provide K-12 education and thus has no direct 
expenditures on K-12 education.  
 
TABLE 4. STATE SHARE OF EXPENDITURES 
 --------Direct Expenditures------- --------Total Expenditures-------- 
 1991-92 2003-04 1991-92 2003-04 
Georgia 39.5% 42.5% 53.7% 58.5% 
United States 43.3% 44.9% 60.6% 62.1% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, State and Local Government Finances.  
 
We now consider the state share of direct expenditure by expenditure 
categories.  These categories are used by the Bureau of the Census in their reports of 
government finances data.  Table 5 contains state and local spending per capita and 
the state share of direct expenditures for the U.S. and Georgia for 2003-04, the latest 
year of data available from the Census.  We use Census data since it allows 
comparisons over time and across jurisdictions. 
TABLE 5. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DIRECT EXPENDITURES, 2003-2004 
 --------------United States------------- ------------------Georgia----------------- 
 -------Per Capita----- -------Per Capita------ 
 
Category 
 
State 
 
Local 
 
Percent 
State 
 
State 
 
Local 
 
Percent 
State 
Total $3,475 $4,244 45.0 $2,788 $3,765 42.6 
Education       
   Higher Education 495 96 83.7 499 3 99.4 
   Elementary & Secondary 20 1,522 1.3 0 1,512 0 
   Other Education 103 0 100.0 143 0 100.0 
Libraries 1 30 4.5 0 15 0.0 
Social Services & Income Maintenance       
   Public Welfare 998 148 87.1 958 16 98.3 
   Hospitals 137 193 41.4 77 316 19.6 
   Health 101 114 46.9 68 110 38.2 
   Other  21 0 100.0 22 0 100.0 
Transportation       
   Highways 247 157 61.1 156 117 57.2 
   Other Transportation 9 72 11.1 17 67 20.2 
Public safety       
   Police Protection 32 206 13.6 25 161 13.4 
   Fire Protection 0 97 0.0 0 80 0.0 
   Correction 126 67 65.4 141 66 68.3 
   Protective Inspection & Regulation 26 13 67.2 10 14 42.1 
Environment and Housing       
   Natural Resources 59 21 73.9 58 2 96.0 
   Parks & Recreation 16 88 15.0 16 59 21.0 
   Housing & Community Develop. 15 112 11.5 4 80 4.9 
   Sewerage 3 45 6.3 0 133 0.0 
   Solid Waste Management 10 59 14.5 3 56 4.5 
Governmental Administration       
   Financial 73 50 59.1 46 38 54.8 
   Judicial & Legal 52 60 46.4 21 67 23.5 
   General Public Buildings 9 31 23.6 10 30 25.0 
   Other Government Administration 14 54 20.0 6 70 8.0 
Interest on General Debt 113 166 40.3 52 74 41.0 
Other Direct Expenditures 118 224 34.3 82 130 38.7 
Source:  U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2003-04 State and Local Government Finances.  
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A.  Education and Libraries 
It is commonly argued that the provision of elementary and secondary 
education and of libraries should be the responsibility of local governments because 
residents of the jurisdiction where the schools and libraries are located are best able to 
determine what is needed and those residents receive most of the benefit of these 
services.  The state’s role is to set standards and to help fund education.  This is the 
pattern observed in the United States generally and in Georgia.  In Georgia, 100 
percent of the direct expenditures on elementary and secondary education and on 
libraries are made by local governments.  This is the pattern for other states as well; 
the exception is Hawaii, where the state provides elementary and secondary 
education.   
 State governments provide funding through grants to local school systems.  In 
Georgia, the state government provides more than half of the funding for elementary 
and secondary education.  In addition, the state provides some grants for libraries.  
Higher education, on the other hand, is nearly 100 percent a state function in 
Georgia; local governments in Georgia account for less than 1 percent of the direct 
expenditures on higher education.7  Nationally, some local governments provide 
higher education, for example, New York City.  The rational for the state to have 
responsibility for providing higher education is that there are significant benefit 
spillovers beyond the borders of any one city or county as students come to 
community colleges, colleges and universities from a wider area than that covered by 
the local government.  The “other education” category includes educational 
administration, tuition grants, aid to private schools, and special programs.   
Overall, education accounts for 32.9 percent of total state and local 
government direct expenditures in Georgia.  Whether this is the right allocation of 
expenditures in Georgia is not an easy question to answer.   
For the United States, education accounts for 29.0 percent of total state and 
local direct expenditures.  Expenditures per capita on education in Georgia have been 
rising  since  at  least  1991  (Figure 3).    In   general,   expenditures   per   capita   for  
 
                                                 
7 Higher education includes colleges and universities as well as adult vocational educational 
programs. 
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FIGURE 3.  PER CAPITA EXPENDITURES ON EDUCATION: GEORGIA 
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Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, State and Local Government Finances.   
 
 
elementary and secondary  education  have been growing at a fast pace, while 
expenditures per capita on higher education have been rising slowly and expenditures 
per capita for libraries and other education have been relatively flat.  
 
B.  Social Services and Income Maintenance 
In the area of social services and income maintenance, the largest expenditure 
category is public welfare.8  In fact, public welfare is the largest single expenditure 
category for state governments in the U.S. and in Georgia. 
As can be seen in Table 5, public welfare is mainly a direct expenditure of the 
state government, both in Georgia and the United States.  The hospitals and health 
categories refer to expenditures by government through its own hospitals and health 
agencies.  In Georgia, hospitals are mainly a local function and much more so than is 
found in other states.  Expenditures on health, for example public health agencies, are 
split between state and local governments, although this function is more local in 
Georgia than for the United States.  The assignment of general welfare spending at 
                                                 
8 Public welfare refers to assistance to needy person contingent on their need and includes direct 
payment such as TANF and payments for medical care. 
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the state level and more specific services (hospitals) at the local level is roughly in 
line with the correspondence principles outlined above.   
Total direct expenditures per capita on social services and income 
maintenance have been relatively stable in the United States over the past 10 years. 
However, as shown in Figure 4, in Georgia spending on public welfare rose between 
1992 and 1997, but fell sharply in 1998, and then regained its upward trend. The 
post-1997 drop is attributed to changes in the laws governing welfare payments, 
including welfare reform, and to a strong economy.  The rise in public welfare 
expenditures post-2000 is related to the economic downturn and the continued 
increase in population of the state. 
 
FIGURE 4.  EXPENDITURES ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:  GEORGIA 
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C.  Transportation  
The highway category includes construction, maintenance, and operation of 
highways, streets, and related structures.  State and local governments share this 
responsibility, although the state share is somewhat larger than the local share.  This 
is to be expected given that the system of roads and highways can be used by a wide 
variety of individuals from various jurisdictions.  Georgia has a state-local split that is 
similar to that for the United States as a whole.  Other transportation, which includes 
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air transportation, parking facilities, and transit subsidies, is largely a local function 
based on local usage. However, in Georgia, the state share is twice as large as the 
average for the United States.   
In Georgia, state and local expenditures per capita on highways have 
increased since 1992, but expenditures per capita on other transportation has been 
virtually constant (Figure 5).  
 
FIGURE 5.  EXPENDITURES IN TRANSPORTATION:  GEORGIA 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 2001-02 2003-04
Year
$ per capita
State Highways State Sea/Island Ports Local Hwy Air Trans
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, State and Local Government Finances.   
 
D.  Public Safety    
Police and fire protection are largely local functions both in Georgia and in 
the United States as a whole.  On the other hand, corrections are largely a state 
function.  Protective inspection and regulation, which includes regulation of private 
enterprise for the protection of the public and inspection of hazardous activities, is 
much more a local function in Georgia than on average for the United States.   
Expenditures per capita in this category have increased since 1992, and the 
mix  of expenditures has changed somewhat (Figure 6).  Local spending per capita on 
police protection and state spending on correction in Georgia increased steadily since 
1992 relative to the other categories.   
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FIGURE 6.  EXPENDITURES ON PUBLIC SAFETY:  GEORGIA 
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Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, State and Local Government Finances.   
 
 
 
E.  Environment and Housing   
Other than the natural resources category (which refers to the conservation, 
promotion, and development of natural resources), expenditures for environment and 
housing are made largely by local governments.  And, other than parks and 
recreation, local governments in Georgia have a greater responsibility for these direct 
expenditures than do local governments throughout the United States.  Once again, 
this distribution of expenditure responsibilities is roughly what is supported by the 
correspondence principle.   
Expenditures per capita in this area have been rising slowly since 1992.  The 
housing category is one area where the correspondence principle may be breached.  
Similar to welfare spending, parts of this category are aimed at redistribution and 
local  spending  may  attract  individuals  to  a  locality  so  that they can receive these  
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FIGURE 7.  EXPENDITURES ON ENVIRONMENT AND HOUSING:  GEORGIA 
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Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, State and Local Government Finances.   
 
 
types of public benefits.  However, much of the local housing authorities are funded 
through grants from higher levels of government, so the actual local discretion is not 
necessarily commensurate with the total level of expenditures made. 
 
 
F.  Government Administration 
Financial administration is split between local and state governments, 
although the state share is larger than the state’s share of total direct expenditures, but 
is close to the state’s share to total expenditures.  For the United States, state 
governments have a greater responsibility for judicial and legal function than is the 
case in Georgia.  The other government administration category includes functions 
such as planning and zoning, and is largely a local function in Georgia, although 
states have a larger role in the rest of the United States.  
Expenditures per capita on state financial administration have been growing, 
as has local judicial and legal expenditures (Figure 8).  Spending per capita on other 
categories of expenditures in this area has remained more or less constant. 
 
 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Georgia 
 
 
 27
FIGURE 8: PER CAPITA EXPENDITURES FOR GENERAL GOVERNMENT 
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G.  Summary 
 The distribution of expenditures between the state and local governments and 
among expenditure categories in Georgia largely conforms to the policy norms of 
expenditure assignment.  There are, however, some areas where the distribution of 
responsibilities in Georgia differs from the national average.  These include 
categories for which Georgia state government per capita spending is substantially 
lower than the national average (hospitals, health, protective inspection and 
regulation, housing and community development, sewerage, judicial and legal, and 
other government administration), and greater than the national average (higher 
education, public welfare, and natural resources).  Does this difference in 
concentration of expenditures mean the Georgia’s intergovernmental finances are 
inappropriate?  The answer to that question is not an easy yes or no.  The expenditure 
categories for which the state has greater than average responsibility can be argued to 
be redistributive, or have an impact that extends beyond most local government 
borders.  These categories are in line with the principles of expenditure assignment.  
The same correspondence holds for the categories for which the state of Georgia 
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spends less—these types of expenditures tend to be more local in nature, with less 
spillover. 
 Then, why does Georgia allocate these responsibilities quite differently from 
the average U.S. state?  One reason is simply history—an in-depth analysis of these 
categories may suggest that they have developed as more local or more state 
expenditures based on original budgetary allocations and preferences.  Politics could 
be another reason—local legislators may have fought harder for control over public 
services that they could provide to their constituents.  It may be that these public 
services simply have less (or more as the case may be) spillovers in Georgia—thus 
justifying the expenditure distribution between the state and local governments.   
None of the expenditure responsibility distributions is so out of line with the 
principles of expenditure assignment to call for an immediate change.  However, for 
those categories where Georgia is substantially different from the U.S. average, more 
careful analysis could be done to see if the spillovers are large enough (or small 
enough) to warrant reconsideration of the state-local share of expenditure assignment.  
This is important from the perspective of efficient public management.  If, for 
instance, it was determined that hospital services supported by local government 
funds were actually used by a constituency that extended well beyond the boundaries 
of the local government, then it may be the case that local governments provide too 
little of the service (due to resource constraints).  In such a case, a more efficient 
outcome may be to shift more responsibility to the state government.  This type of 
judgment should only be made after careful study of the service area and clients of 
the specifically mentioned public services.  In this section, we have simply 
highlighted expenditure responsibilities that might be studied further. 
 
 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Georgia 
 
 
 29
V.  Revenue 
Similar to the expenditure side of the story, there is also a set of principles 
that are used to evaluate a revenue source or revenue structure, including fairness, 
administrative feasibility, revenue sufficiency, and the impact of taxes on the 
behavior of firms and individuals.  In addition, there are principles that help guide the 
decision regarding which revenue sources should be employed at the local and at the 
state level.  A “good” local revenue source is one that yields a stable flow of revenue, 
i.e., does not fluctuate over the business cycle, can be administered at the local level 
at a reasonable cost, generally relates to the public services provided, and uses a base 
that is relatively geographically immobile.   
The application of these principles yields different implications for state and 
local governments.  For example, given the differences in their geographic size, the 
mobility of a tax base is less of a problem for state governments than for local 
governments.  Thus, a property tax is more suitable for a local government than a 
sales tax.  These principles also suggest that state and local taxes should not be very 
progressive since progressive taxes would induce high-income households to move to 
other jurisdictions.  However, the likelihood that a progressive income tax will cause 
a family to move to another local jurisdiction is much higher than the likelihood that 
it will cause an inter-state move.  Thus, it is more important for local governments to 
refrain from highly progressive taxes than for state governments.   
In large part, the assignment of revenue between state and local governments 
in Georgia follows the principles outlined above, and is similar to the average for the 
United States.  However, the mix of revenue sources differs between Georgia and the 
rest of the United States.  Table 6 provides some detail on the types of revenue 
sources used by both levels of government.  The state derives most of its revenues 
from the sales tax and income tax, while local governments use the property tax most 
heavily, which is in keeping with the general principles.  For most of the revenue 
sources, either the state or local government in Georgia is the principal user of the 
revenue source, the major exceptions being the general sales tax and selective sales 
taxes.   
 
 
 
TABLE 6. PER CAPITA STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE, 2003-2004 
 ---------------United States--------------- ------------------Georgia----------------- 
 --------Per Capita------- -------Per Capita------ 
Category State Local 
Percent 
State State Local 
Percent 
State 
Total general revenue $4082 $3735  $3163 $3156  
Intergovernmental revenue 1349 1467  1020 1101  
    From Federal Government 1281 174 88.2 1014 97 91.3 
    From State government 0 1293 0.0 0 1004 0.0 
    From local governments 68 0 100.0 6 0 100.0 
       
General revenue from own sources 2733 2268 54.6 2143 2055 51.0 
       
    Taxes 2018 1432 58.4 1634 1243 56.8 
        Property 37 1049 3.4 7 872 0.08 
        General sales tax 1003 230 81.3 725 331 68.6 
        Motor fuel 115 4 96.6 85 0 100.0 
        Alcoholic beverage 16 1 92.1 17 13 56.2 
        Tobacco products 42 1 97.4 25 0 100.0 
        Public utilities 37 37 50.0 0 25 0.0 
        Other selective sales 116 26 81.4 46 49 48.7 
        Individual income 671 65 91.2 766 0 100.0 
        Corporate income 103 12 89.7 55 0 100.0 
        Motor vehicle license 59 5 92.7 31 0 100.0 
        Other taxes 145 72 66.7 48 39 55.2 
    Charges 393 593 39.8 509 812 38.5 
        Education 220 69 76.2 166 31 84.3 
        Hospitals 91 158 36.4 42 297 12.4 
        Other charges 82 366 18.3 60 253 19.2 
    Miscellaneous general revenue 322 242 57.0 241 231 51.0 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau, 2003-04 State and Local Government Finances. 
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The differences between Georgia and the U.S. are in terms of the intensity of 
usage of certain revenue sources by the state and local governments.  For example, 
for the United States, 81.3 percent of sales tax revenue is raised by state governments, 
while in Georgia only 68.6 percent is raised by the state, reflecting the importance of 
local sales taxes in Georgia.  The other principal difference is in taxes on alcoholic 
beverages, with local governments in Georgia using this revenue source more 
intensively than for the United States as a whole.  
For Fiscal year 2003-04 in Georgia, about 51.7 percent of the state’s general 
revenue was raised through taxes, while only 39.4 percent of local government 
revenue came from taxes.  The other revenue came from intergovernmental grants 
and from charges for services, such as college tuition at state colleges and 
universities, fees collected at parking facilities, school lunch sales, and sewerage fees 
collected from homeowners.  A heavier fee-based revenue structure is not unusual for 
local governments. 
 Georgia’s per capita tax collections have been on the rise since the early 
1990s (Figure 9).  Increases in local sales taxes are obviously explained by the 
adoption of local option sales taxes by counties and school districts.  As of January 
2007, 147 counties had a 3 percent local sales tax rate.  Local property taxes per 
capita experienced a slow climb over the same period.  The state individual income 
tax is the largest single revenue source, and its steady growth is attributed to the 
robust economy and the migration of upwardly-mobile individuals to Georgia.  The 
remainder of this section provides more detailed analysis of the more important 
revenue streams of the state and local governments. 
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FIGURE 9.  PER CAPITA STATE REVENUES 
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A.  Income Taxes 
 The state relies heavily on the individual income tax to finance the state 
budget.  The corporate income tax is also an important, albeit much smaller source of 
state revenue.  As mentioned earlier, the state Constitution allows local income taxes, 
but they have not been used to this date in Georgia.  Nationwide, the local income tax 
has not been utilized extensively; currently there are 11 states in which local 
governments impose the local income tax.  Local income taxes can meet the criteria 
of a good local tax if they are imposed at relatively low and flat rates (thus reducing 
the incentive to move because of the tax).   
At the state level, income taxes are used much more widely, and are currently 
in place in 44 states.  Georgia’s income tax is a mildly progressive income tax—with 
rates ranging from 0 to 6 percent of state taxable income.  States may be able to use 
progressive income taxes when local governments are less able because the costs of 
moving from a state to escape the tax are typically larger than moving from one 
jurisdiction in a state to another.  In general, Georgia’s de facto assignment of income 
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tax to the state level is an acceptable intergovernmental relationship based on the 
principles of revenue assignment. 
 
B.  Sales Tax 
Sales taxes are a much more dynamic intergovernmental issue than other 
taxes in Georgia as well as other states.  Over the years, more and more states have 
authorized local sales taxes.  For example, in the early 1960s, 12 states authorized 
local government sales taxes, while more recently 33 states had such authorizations.  
In most cases, authorization by the state does not require that local governments 
adopt a local sales tax, but instead allows them to choose to adopt.  This is the case of 
the local sales tax in Georgia.   
 In 1975, the Georgia state legislature granted permission to local governments 
to adopt a county-level local option sales tax (LOST).  Adoption must be approved in 
a county referendum; revenues are distributed between the county government and 
municipalities in the county based on an agreed upon formula.  Although several 
counties adopted a LOST virtually immediately, other counties waited years before 
adopting.  To date, only five of the 159 counties have yet to adopt a LOST.   
 Similar to an income tax, a low sales tax rate could qualify as a decent fiscal 
tool for state and local governments.  High differential tax rates at a local level 
encourage cross-border shopping and high tax rates increase competition among local 
governments for sales tax base.  In addition, increased local rates, on top of the state 
rate, may encourage out-of-state shopping so that consumers avoid the entire sales 
tax—state plus local.  As the average top state plus local rate has crept closer to 7 
percent, the issue of out of state consumption becomes more real.9   
 
C.  Property Tax 
 The property tax is by far the most important local government tax in Georgia 
and in most other states.  It is thought to be an efficient local tax—the land portion of 
                                                 
9 The weighted average local sales tax rate is 2.8 percent.  
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the tax base is not mobile, and structures are not very mobile.  This makes it difficult 
to escape the property tax, at least the real property component.   
 Most states treat the property tax as largely a local government tax, as does 
Georgia.  There is no economic reason why the property tax should not be used by 
the state government.  Rather the issue is more a matter of a providing a tax source 
that is almost solely just for local governments.   
 
D. Excise Tax 
 In state and local fiscal systems, there are three widely taxed goods—alcohol, 
tobacco, and fuel.  The taxes on alcohol and tobacco are often referred to as “sin 
taxes” in that they may be imposed to affect behavior that has costs to society 
(accidents and health problems related to drinking and smoking).  Taxes on fuel are 
considered a benefit tax since the taxes paid are related to the use of roads.    
There is some justification for either or both levels of government levying 
these taxes, particularly fuel taxes since both local and the state government build and 
maintain roads.  In Georgia, tobacco and motor fuel taxes are completely state 
government taxes, while local governments can add an additional excise tax for 
alcohol.  Most states treat these excises as state government revenue sources, so it is 
unusual for Georgia to allow the local component of the alcohol excise tax.  
However, as a share of total revenue, the local excise tax generates very little 
revenue. 
 
E. Other Revenue 
 Other revenue of the state and local governments in Georgia provide much 
smaller amounts of funding.  Other taxes include inheritance taxes, licenses, and 
transfer taxes, among others.  The state share of these other taxes for Georgia is not 
out of line with the average U.S. state.  Finally, Table 6 reports a category of 
miscellaneous general revenue, which includes fines, sales of property, and rents, to 
name a few.  Again, Georgia’s split of these revenues between state and local 
government is congruent with other states. 
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F.  Summary 
From an intergovernmental perspective, Georgia’s revenue structure is not 
out of line in terms of state versus local use of revenue sources, compared to the 
average U.S. state and in terms of the principles noted above.  The most important 
differences in Georgia relate to the heavy use of general and selective sales tax by 
local governments.   
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V.  Grants in Aid 
The final piece of the intergovernmental fiscal story in Georgia revolves 
around grants—payments among levels of government.  We now turn to that review.  
Intergovernmental revenue consists of payments from one government to 
another, the largest component of which is intergovernmental grants.  Grants may be 
for a specific use (earmarked or categorical grants) or for general use (block grants).   
Grants are a very important source of revenue to states and localities in Georgia, 
accounting for 32.2 percent of general revenue for the state and 34.9 percent for local 
governments.  These shares are very similar for the average of all U.S. states.  The 
federal government does not provide grant funds directly to local governments, 
rather, most federal grants to local governments flow through the state government to 
local government.   
There are a number of important functions or purposes of intergovernmental 
grants:  
1. Grants promote a national standard.  State and local governments do 
not always have the necessary financial resources to meet certain 
goals of the federal or state governments.  These may include levels 
of educational attainment, air quality, and job training.  While local 
governments may be responsible for some of these expenditures, they 
may require additional revenue to carry out service responsibilities 
that may be more expensive due to federal government mandates, 
guidelines, etc. 
 
2. Grants are a way of creating greater equalization among the states and 
municipalities. Grants are the main method of addressing differences 
in resource capacities among state and local governments.  
 
3. Grants are also a way to encourage increased provision of certain 
public services (for example, interstate highways, which have 
substantial spillover benefits) and increased cooperation among 
governments in the delivery of certain public services. 
  
The federal government plays an important intergovernmental role when we 
consider grants.  Federal grants generally increased during the more modern period of 
the U.S. as the federal government assisted state and local government development.  
Currently, federal grants to state and local governments are about 3.4 percent of gross 
domestic product.  As a comparison, total taxes (state and local) are about 30 percent 
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of gross domestic product.   The largest federal grants are for Medicaid, income 
security (including TANF and children’s nutrition programs), transportation, 
education, training, employment, and social services.  Many of these grants flow 
from the federal government to state agencies responsible for particular services.  For 
instance, Medicaid funding from the federal government flows to the state 
Department of Community Health for reimbursements to providers, while some flows 
directly to local hospital authorities. 
Most federal intergovernmental grants go to state governments; in Georgia 
91.3 percent of Federal grants go to the State government.  On the other hand, most 
grants to local governments come from the state.  In Georgia, 91.2 percent of grants 
to local governments come from the State.  However, much of the state grants to local 
jurisdictions are Federal pass-through grants, that is, the state receives a grant from 
the Federal government and then the state allocates those funds to local governments.    
One of the key players in the local intergovernmental arena in Georgia is the 
Department of Community Affairs (DCA).  DCA administers a variety of state and 
federal grant, loan, and tax incentive programs as well as several technical assistance 
and education programs. The following are three of the grant programs DCA 
administers that are funded by Federal grants.  
 
● Community Development Block Grant Program. This is a federal government 
program administrated by the state that provides matching grant funds which 
can assist a wide range of eligible activities, including housing improvement 
projects, public facilities such as water and sewer lines, buildings such as 
local health centers or head start centers, and economic development projects.  
 
● Community HOME Investment Program (CHIP). Created by the National 
Affordable Housing Act of 1990, the Home Investment Partnerships (HOME) 
Program is the first federally funded block grant designed to address state and 
local affordable housing concerns.  
 
● Appalachian Regional Commission. The Appalachian Regional Commission 
is an economic development program providing matching grant funds to 
eligible applicants for projects that benefit the entire 35-county area of 
Appalachian Georgia. 
 
The State does not report the magnitude of the grants to local governments 
that are funded by State own-source funds, as opposed to Federal grants.  Each 
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agency is required to annually report to the Secretary of State’s office all of the grants 
that the agency made during the year.  These include grants made to local 
governments as well as other organizations such as non-profits.  However, the agency 
does not report the source of the funds.   
The largest state grant programs are for K-12 education, and the Department 
of Education does report the magnitude of these grants.  The state funds about 55 
percent of state and local spending on education.  This is a slightly larger share than 
the average for the United States, 53 percent.   
 Most of Georgia’s intergovernmental grants are categorical in nature, 
meaning that the funds have to be spent for specific purposes, versus block grants, 
which provide the local governments more discretion over the actual expenditure. We 
were able to obtain some information on grants to local governments funded by State 
funds from the Senate Budget and Evaluation Office.  The following are non-
educational state funded grants, as opposed to federal pass-through grants, that are 
available to local governments: 
● Local Assistance grants.  These are grants to local governments for specific 
purposes (appropriated $6,540,903 for FY07) 
 
● OneGeorgia-Bridge grants.  These are grants for publicly owned 
infrastructure based on the number of rural counties receiving new or 
enhanced high speed broadband services.  ($88,600 worth of grants given out 
for Calendar Year 2006) 
 
● OneGeorgia-Edge Fund grants.  These grants are utilized when one rural 
Georgia community competes for business location and/or expansion with 
another community from outside the state. ($4,161,000 worth of grants given 
out for Calendar Year 2006) 
 
● OneGeorgia-Equity Fund grants.  These grants provide financial assistance to 
rural communities to help build the necessary infrastructure for economic 
development. ($7,533,625 worth of grants given out for Calendar Year 2006) 
 
● Georgia Environmental Facilities Authority (GEFA) Grants. These grants are 
for environmental facilities.  $200,000 is available to local governments for 
recycling and waste reduction.  $500,000 is available for small communities 
that own or operate a water system to build or expand a public sewer system. 
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● Department of Transportation Local Road Assistance Program (LARP) 
grants.  These grants provide contracts with local governments to assist in the 
construction and reconstruction of their local road, bridge, and street systems. 
(appropriated $124,900,000 for FY07) 
 
● Local Law Enforcement and Fire Services State Grant Program-Criminal 
Justice Coordinating Council.  These grants  are for law enforcement and fire 
services to assist with regular operating expenses.(appropriated $500,000 for 
FY07) 
 
● Local Community-Based Delinquency Prevention Grants-Children and Youth 
Coordinating Council.  These grants are available for local governments, non-
profit organizations, and school systems. (appropriated $500,000 for FY07) 
 
● Georgia Public Library Service-Awards grants from the Public Library Fund.  
These grants are for providing library services for Georgians (Appropriated 
$34,878,668 for FY07). 
 
● County Department of Family and Children Services (DFACS) grants.  These 
grants support the operations of county DFACS offices.  In 2006 these grants 
amounted to $417,193,923. 
 
● County/District Health Department grants.  These grants support public 
health activities.  In FY 2006 total funds amounted to $208,509,626. 
 
● State Economic Development funds.  In FY 2007, these totaled $15,279,024. 
 
● Special housing initiatives help to fund various housing programs.  In FY 
2007 these totaled $3,332,892. 
 
The amounts of these grants are not reported on a consistent basis.  Despite 
that, the total is $823 million, or about $88 per capita.  As noted above, these grants 
are targeted grants, meant for specific types of expenditures.  Georgia does not report 
a substantial number of block grants. The state-to-local intergovernmental grants in 
Georgia generally support expenditures that have significant spillovers, like education 
and health, and economic development.  Once again, this fits the intergovernmental 
framework outlined earlier in this report. 
Data do not exist that would allow a comparison of state-funded grants to 
non-school local governments between Georgia and the average for other states.  
However, some states do provide information on the extent of their state-funded non-
education grants to local governments.  Michigan’s House Fiscal Agency provides an 
annual directory of state administered grants.  The directory lists the grants, the 
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department in charge of their administration, and the funding agency (state or federal 
or a combination) and amount (not broken down by funder in the case of multiple 
funders).  The state administered $45 million in federal community development 
block grants in fiscal year 2005-06.  In fiscal year 2005-06, the largest of the state-
only grants to local governments in Michigan included grants in the following areas 
(excluding education), most of which are categorical in nature: 
● Aging services:  $13.2 million 
● Community corrections:  $40 million 
● Courts:  $90 million 
● Economic development:  $100 million 
● Emergency management:  $35 million 
● Energy (including low income assistance): $61 million 
● Environment:  $24 million 
● Health:  $62 million 
● Housing:  $17.9 million 
● Jobs training:  $9.7 million 
● Law enforcement:  $28 million 
● Library:  $14 million 
● Recreation:  $57 million 
● Revenue sharing:  sales tax $693 million based on population plus $423 
million based on a combination of population, property value, yield 
equalization 
● Technology:  $4.5 million 
● Transportation:  $1 billion 
● Veterans:  $5.5 million 
 
These grants (excluding the sales tax revenue sharing) amount to $157.75 per 
person in 2006 in Michigan.  New York State provides a variety of grants to local 
governments. The NYS Aid and Incentive to Municipalities (AIM) is a type of block 
grant that includes various criteria for eligibility including proof of a multi-year 
budgeting plan and a property tax relief plan for use of incremental AIM funds.  For 
2006-07 New York State plans expenditures of $976 million for these grants 
(including $327 million for New York City).  These general grants are equivalent to 
$51.63 per person in New York.  Wisconsin offers a comprehensive planning grant to 
local governments ($2 million funding in 2006), which is used for developing 
cooperation among local governments in planning for growth.  Wisconsin has a grant 
program (shared revenue program) that provides general revenue assistance to 
municipal and county governments.  The grant is allocated by formula that depends 
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on such factors as population and taxable property wealth.  In FY 2006, the grants 
amounted to $1.6 billion or about $294 per capita. 
From these examples we can see that comparing the level and type of grants 
from state to local governments across the U.S. is difficult.  In addition, from state-to-
state, local governments have different expenditure responsibilities and some of those 
responsibilities require more intergovernmental financing.  The detailed example of 
Michigan and the information for New York and Wisconsin may serve to 
demonstrate the type and level of grants that other states make available to local 
governments.  The differences in the level of grants from state to state may be 
somewhat mitigated by the level of taxing power given to local governments.  In 
Georgia, local governments have substantial sales tax options in terms of local option 
sales tax rates. 
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VI.  The Landscape 
 Intergovernmental fiscal relations is reflected in the assignment of revenue 
sources and public service responsibilities, and the financial relationships between 
governments, largely reflected by the system of intergovernmental grants and service 
agreements.  Intergovernmental fiscal relations, whether they are between state and 
local governments or between local governments, depend on the legal framework that 
regulates these relationships and on the degree of homogeneity of the population.   
How governments behave towards one another also depends on the degree of 
similarity in the population.  If the population is homogeneous, then agreement and 
cooperation is easier to obtain.  If there are major differences in the nature of the 
population in terms of public service needs, available resources, and views of the role 
of government, then agreement is harder to obtain and there will likely be more 
conflicts.  The legal structure can help or hinder the ability to reach agreement, but of 
course the setting of the legal structure is the result of a political process that is 
affected by the level of homogeneity of the population.   
 
A.  Population  
Georgia’s population has boomed over the past three and a half decades, 
nearly doubling between 1970 and 2006.  In 1990, Georgia was the 11th most 
populous state, and by 2006 it rose to the 9th most populous state, with a population 
of 9,363,941—the result of a 44.6 percent increase in population from 1990-2006.   
While Georgia is one of the fastest growing states, its population growth has 
not been uniform across the state.  The metro Atlanta area and surrounding counties 
have posted some of the largest population growth.  Of the increase in the state’s 
population during the 1990s, 67.4 percent of it located in the Atlanta Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA).  As of 2000, 50.3 percent of the state’s population resided in 
the Atlanta MSA. 
On the other hand, the more rural, southern region of Georgia has seen much 
slower population growth and even an absolute decline in population in certain 
counties.  Between 1980 and 1990, 42 Georgia counties lost population, while 
between 1990 and 2000, 8 counties lost population.  Six of these 8 counties were in 
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southwest Georgia, and only one of them was in an urban area (Dougherty County).  
Between 1990 and 2000, the urbanized population increased by 43 percent, while the 
non-urban area lost 2.6 percent of its population.  The urbanized population increased 
from 63.2 percent in 1990 to 71.7 percent in 2000.   
The differential population growth across regions in Georgia may have 
affected the ability to make policy related to public finances, schools, and service 
delivery because of the different needs of urban and rural areas.  These regions, by 
their nature, have different concerns and often times different resources available for 
dealing with their concerns.  
A significant component of population growth in Georgia is due to migration 
from other states, many of whom located in the metro Atlanta area.  This is an added 
dimension to policy development—individuals who move into the state may have 
different demands of the public sector than those who originally grew up in the state.  
This leads to conflicts over policy between long-time residents and more recent 
arrivals. 
Georgia is a relatively young state: 7.3 percent of the population is under the 
age of 5, while the national average is 6.8 percent.  But both the younger (those under 
18) and older (those over 65) segments of the population showed the largest percent 
growth over the past two decades.  The percentage of the population under 18 is still 
higher in the southern counties of the state, but there has been an increase in the share 
of this age group in the urban centers of the state.  These population shifts represent 
another source of pressure to the state—the growth in the number of young will call 
for more education funding, while the growth in the number of elderly will create a 
push for more spending on programs such as health care. 
According to the 2000 Census, Georgia’s racial make-up was 65.1 percent 
white, while the U.S. average was 75.1 percent white, non-Hispanic.  In 1990, whites 
comprised 71.0 percent of the population.  Blacks are heavily concentrated in the core 
of urban areas; 10 urban counties contain 61.5 percent of the state’s black population.  
There are 17 counties in which blacks are a majority, but 31 counties in which the 
percentage black is less than 10 percent. 
The Hispanic population increased by nearly 300 percent during the 1990s, 
and now comprises over 5.3 percent of Georgia’s population.  Although there are 7 
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counties in which the percentage of Hispanics exceeds 10 percent, 54.9 percent of 
Hispanics reside in just 5 counties, which are located in the central and northeast 
sector of the Atlanta MSA. 
Because there are racial differences in the needs and preferences for 
government services and in the view of the role of government, and because of 
racism, the growing racial diversity of the state’s population probably makes it more 
difficult for governments to agree on intergovernmental fiscal issues. 
 
B.  Employment 
Population and employment growth are highly related, and it is commonly 
believed that employment growth is the major catalyst of population growth; without 
jobs, people migrate to other areas.  Population and economic growth outside of the 
Atlanta Metropolitan Statistical Area has been relatively flat, while counties lying in 
the Atlanta metro area have shown marked gains in population and income.  The 
Atlanta metro area is home to thriving industries, which have drawn upwardly mobile 
migrants from across the country.  The agricultural economies of South Georgia have 
been less able to attract affluent individuals.  
From December 1990-December 2005, total non-farm employment growth in 
Georgia averaged 2.34 percent per year, while the national rate was 1.29 percent over 
the same period.  In the Southeast region of the U.S., Florida’s employment growth is 
almost identical to Georgia’s growth, but all of the other Southeast states grew at 
much slower rates.  The employment growth over the last two decades came largely 
in the service sector, as is true in most states in the United States. During the 
economic downturn in 2000-2002, Georgia’s relative position of employment 
strength faltered.  In 1999, Georgia’s unemployment rate was 84 percent of that of the 
nation as a whole; in 2002, it was 104 percent of the nation’s unemployment rate, 
while in December 2006 it was essentially the same as the nation’s unemployment 
rate. 
Similar to what we’ve seen in population growth, the growth in employment 
has not been uniform across the state.  The largest employment gains came in the 
Atlanta metropolitan region, thus exacerbating other economic and demographic 
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trends.  There are 17 non-urban counties that experienced employment loss over the 
period 1988-1997.  Part of the explanation for this geographic difference in 
employment is the changing nature of the Georgia economy.  Over the past several 
decades Georgia’s economic base has changed from a concentration in 
manufacturing, non-durable goods and agriculture to retail trade, wholesale trade, and 
services.  The former industries were more likely to be located in rural areas, while 
the later are more likely to be found in urban areas. 
 
C.  Income  
Accompanying the population growth of the state has been an increase in per 
capita income.  Georgia has had the second fastest per capita income growth in the 
country since 1969 (Colorado has seen the fastest growth in relative terms).  In 2005, 
Georgia ranked 34th in the nation in per capita income with a mean household income 
of $31,191.  This is somewhat less than the national mean of $34,395.  
Per capita income is a way to measure the differences in underlying economic 
capacity or strength of each county.  Table 7 compares the wealth of Georgia’s urban 
areas in 2004, Figure 14 shows the how income per capita differs across all 159 
counties of Georgia.  As shown below, the per capita personal income in Georgia’s 
metropolitan areas is 29 percent higher than incomes in rural Georgia.  
 
TABLE 7:  REGIONAL COMPARISON OF PER CAPITA PERSONAL INCOME, 2004  
Area PCPI 
U.S. 
Rank 
%Chg 2003-
04 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Gainesville, GA $31,485 39 6.1 
Savannah-Hinesville-Fort Stewart, GA $27,489 105 6.9 
Augusta-Richmond County, GA $26,329 129 5.5 
Columbus-Auburn-Opelika GA-AL $26,132 132 5.5 
Macon-Warner Robbins-Fort Valley, GA $25,330 151 5.1 
Albany, GA $22,354 177 4.0 
Georgia Statewide $29,737 37 5.9 
Georgia-Metropolitan $31,534  6.0 
Georgia-Non Metropolitan $22,497  5.5 
Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Accounts.  
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FIGURE 14.  PER CAPITA PERSONAL INCOME BY GEORGIA COUNTY, 2004 
 
 
Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Accounts.  http://www.bea.gov/bea/ 
regional/reis. 
 
D.  Intra-State Disparities 
The five counties in Georgia with the highest per capita personal income in 
2004 are Fulton, Fayette, Cobb, DeKalb, and Harris, in descending order.  The five 
counties with the lowest per-capita income are Charlton, Telfair, Hancock, Echols, 
and Wheeler.  Four of the five most affluent counties (Fulton, Fayette, Cobb, and 
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DeKalb) are the core of Metropolitan Atlanta, while Harris County, in west central 
Georgia, is part of the Columbus Metropolitan Statistical Area.  Meanwhile, the 
counties with the lowest incomes are scattered through the most rural areas the state:  
Charlton, Telfair, Echols, and Wheeler are spread throughout southeast Georgia, 
while Hancock County lies in east central Georgia.  
The disparities in income are matched, in general, with voting power in terms 
of population.  The higher income counties tend to have larger populations (and 
population growth), while the lower income counties cannot count on large 
constituencies to push their agenda forward.   
 The information presented above paints a picture of Georgia as a fast growing 
state in terms of both population and income, but also of great diversity across the 
state.  The economic diversity has implications for local governments in Georgia.  
Across the state, local governments face very different pressures for services and 
have different revenue raising abilities due to the difference in the level and growth of 
income, population, and employment.   
 Table 8 presents several measures for 10 counties that summarize the wide 
variation in fiscal abilities of counties in Georgia to meet the needs of their 
constituents. The relatively low levels of income, high unemployment and low 
property values in Charlton, Telfair, Hancock, Echols, and Wheeler counties relative 
to the average for the state and the high income counties mean that these counties 
have less fiscal capacity to produce own-source revenues.  High levels of poverty call 
for different levels (and types) of public services in the various counties.  Even in 
high-income Fulton County there are obvious disparities among the population as 
reflected in the county’s poverty rate, which is higher than that of the state as a 
whole.  
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TABLE 8:  SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR HIGH AND LOW INCOME COUNTIES 
County 
Income 
Rank 
Population 
(2005 
estimate) 
2004 Per 
Capita 
Federal 
Spending 
2004 
Average 
earnings 
per job 
2004 Per 
Capita 
Personal 
Income 
Transfers 
Statewide n/a 9,072,576 $6,079.08 $43,159 $3,974 
Fulton 1 915,623 $10,379.55 $65,257 $3,259 
Fayette 2 104,248 $3,678.55 $32,334 $3,119 
Cobb 3 663,818 $4,488.54 $47,730 $2,816 
Dekalb 4 677,659 $4,294.02 $48,048 $3,554 
Harris 5 27,779 $3,873.90 $20,721 $3,606 
Charlton 155 10,790 $5,196.48 $26,329 $5,052 
Telfair 156 13,208 $7,933.00 $24,929 $6,220 
Hancock 157 9,643 $8,518.93 $23,739 $5,970 
Echols 158 4,253 $2,432.17 $15,170 $2,923 
Wheeler 159 6,706 $5,726.81 $27,796 $4,683 
Sources:  Census Quickfacts (Population Estimate), 2004 Consolidated Federal Funds Report 
(Federal Spending), Bureau of Economic Accounts Regional Economic Profiles (Earnings per job 
and income transfers).  
 
E.  Political Environment 
Changes in the socioeconomic characteristics of the state get reflected in the 
political orientation of the population.  The state had remained largely a one-party 
state throughout its post-Civil War history; the Democratic Party had control of the 
governorship and the General Assembly for the longest run of any U.S. state, 
remaining in power since Reconstruction.  In the past 25 years, Republicans have 
significantly increased their presence in the General Assembly, finally gaining 
control of the Governor’s mansion after the 2002 gubernatorial election.  The rise of 
the Republication Party in Georgia is clearly evident in Table 9, which shows the 
political party composition of the General Assembly over the past 25 years.  
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TABLE 9. PARTY COMPOSITION OF GEORGIA LEGISLATURE 
-------------------------Senate------------------------  
Year Democrats Republicans % Republicans 
1979-80 52 4 7.1 
1989-90 45 11 19.6 
1999-00 34 22 39.3 
2005-06 22 34 60.7 
2007-08 22 34 60.7 
-------------------------House-------------------------  
Year Democrats Republicans % Republicans 
1979-80 160 20 11.1 
1989-90 144 36 20.0 
1999-00 102 78 43.3 
2005-06 80 99 55.0 
2007-08 74 106 58.9 
Note that in 2005-06 there was one independent. 
Source: Georgia Secretary of State. 
 
 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Georgia 
 
 
 50 
VIII.  Conclusions and Future Agenda 
Georgia’s system of expenditure and revenue assignment generally fits well 
with the norms of good policy.  However, the level of disparities within the state in 
population, income, and employment, along with the increasing immigration, merits a 
dynamic intergovernmental system necessary to meet the needs of the population.   
There are some outliers in Georgia’s intergovernmental system.  On the 
expenditure side, local governments in Georgia support a larger share (relative to the 
state) of hospitals, health, protective inspection and regulation, housing and 
community development, sewerage, judicial and legal, and other government 
administration expenses and a smaller share on higher education, public welfare, and 
natural resources.  It may very well be that given the disparities in income in the state, 
there is less demand on local government to provide certain public services.  As the 
economy of the state continues to expand, the local demand mix may change the 
relative shares of these expenditure items.   
On the revenue side, the local government share of sales tax is substantially 
higher than that of other states.  Given the potential for encroachment on property tax 
growth (due to limitations on assessments and other possible reforms), sales tax is a 
vulnerable revenue source.  Some local governments may be better able to afford 
increases in sales tax usage (due to higher incomes), while other localities may not be 
able to scratch out as much from an increased sales tax.  Intergovernmental grants 
may be an option to help mitigate the costs of increased sales taxes, but the state and 
local governments would need to analyze such an option together—which may not be 
an easy political feat.   
Overall, it is not obvious that Georgia’s intergovernmental system has any 
major flaws in its expenditure or revenue assignment that will cause long-term harm 
to the state and local governments of Georgia. 
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safeguard the academic freedom of authors.  Thus, interpretations or conclusions in 
FRC publications should be understood to be solely those of the author. 
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FISCAL RESEARCH CENTER STAFF 
David L. Sjoquist, Director and Professor of Economics 
Peter Bluestone, Research Associate 
Margo Doers, Administrative Coordinator 
Jaiwan M. Harris, Business Manager 
Kenneth J. Heaghney, State Fiscal Economist 
John W. Matthews, Senior Research Associate 
Nara Monkam, Research Associate 
Lakshmi Pandey, Senior Research Associate 
Rob Salvino, Research Associate 
Nikola Tasic, Research Associate 
Dorie Taylor, Assistant Director 
Arthur D. Turner, Microcomputer Software Technical Specialist 
Sally Wallace, Associate Director and Professor of Economics 
Laura A. Wheeler, Senior Research Associate 
Tumika Williams, Staff Assistant 
 
ASSOCIATED GSU FACULTY 
James Alm, Chair and Professor of Economics 
Roy W. Bahl, Dean and Professor of Economics 
Spencer Banzhaf, Associate Professor of Economics 
Carolyn Bourdeaux, Assistant Professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies 
Robert Eger, Assistant Professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies 
Martin F. Grace, Professor of Risk Management and Insurance 
Shiferaw Gurmu, Associate Professor of Economics 
Douglas Krupka, Assistant Professor of Economics 
Gregory B. Lewis, Professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies 
Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez, Professor of Economics 
Theodore H. Poister, Professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies 
David P. Richardson, Professor of Risk Management and Insurance 
Jonathan C. Rork, Assistant Professor of Economics 
Bruce A. Seaman, Associate Professor of Economics 
Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Professor of Economics 
Mary Beth Walker, Associate Professor of Economics 
Katherine G. Willoughby, Professor of Public Administration and Urban Studies 
 
PRINCIPAL ASSOCIATES 
David Boldt, State University of West Georgia  
Gary Cornia, Brigham Young University 
Kelly D. Edmiston, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 
Alan Essig, Georgia Budget and Policy Institute 
Dagney G. Faulk, Indiana University Southeast 
Catherine Freeman, U.S. Department of Education 
Richard R. Hawkins, University of West Florida 
Julie Hotchkiss, Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank 
Mary Mathewes Kassis, State University of West Georgia 
Julia E. Melkers, University of Illinois-Chicago 
Jack Morton, Morton Consulting Group 
Ross H. Rubenstein, Syracuse University 
Michael J. Rushton, Indiana University 
Benjamin P. Scafidi, Georgia College and State University 
Edward Sennoga, Makerere University, Uganda 
William J. Smith, West Georgia College 
Jeanie J. Thomas, Consultant 
Kathleen Thomas, Mississippi State University 
Thomas L. Weyandt, Atlanta Regional Commission 
 
GRADUATE RESEARCH ASSISTANTS:  Nofiya Nahin Shaik ● John Stavick 
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RECENT PUBLICATIONS 
(All publications listed are available at http://frc.aysps.gsu.edu or call the Fiscal Research Center at 
404/651-2782, or fax us at 404/651-2737.) 
 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Georgia (David L. Sjoquist, John Stavick 
and Sally Wallace).  This report documents the intergovernmental fiscal system in 
Georgia, with a focus on the expenditure, revenue, and intergovernmental grant 
system in the state.  FRC Report 141 (February 2007) 
 
Comparing State Income Tax Preferences for the Elderly in the Southeast 
(Jonathan C. Rork).  This brief looks at the current state of these tax preferences in 
the Southeast for those states that impose a major income tax and estimates the dollar 
value of these preferences.  FRC Brief 140 (February 2007) 
 
State Tax Incentives for Research and Development Activities:  A Review of State 
Practices (Laura Wheeler).  This report documents state tax incentives offered 
around the country designed to encourage state level R&D activity.  This report also 
simulates the effect of various credit components in the value of the credit  FRC 
Report/Brief 139 (January 2007) 
 
Transportation Funding Alternatives:  A Preliminary Analysis (David L. Sjoquist, 
William J. Smith, Laura Wheeler and Justin Purkey).  This report explores issues 
associated with proposed alternative revenue sources for increasing transportation for 
funding.  FRC Report/Brief 138 (January 2007) 
 
Geographic Breakdown of Georgia’s Interstate Migration Patterns (Jonathan C. 
Rork).  This brief looks at the geographic breakdown of Georgia's interstate 
migration patterns for both the elderly and non-elderly.  FRC Brief 137 (December 
2006)  
 
Inventory Taxes (John Matthews).  Policymakers are considering 100 percent 
inventory tax exemptions as an economic development incentive.  This report reviews 
the potential effectiveness of such exemptions and presents alternative approaches to 
inventory tax exemptions.  FRC Report/Brief 136 (December 2006) 
 
An Assessment of the State of Georgia’s Budget Reserves (Carolyn Bourdeaux).  
This report assesses the adequacy of Georgia’s revenue shortfall reserve.  FRC 
Report 135 (October 2006) 
 
Revenue Losses from Exemptions of Goods from the Georgia Sales and Use Tax 
(William J. Smith and Mary Beth Walker).  This report provides estimates of the 
revenue loss from sales tax exemptions.  FRC Report 134 (September 2006) 
 
Tax Collectibility and Tax Compliance in Georgia (James Alm, David L. Sjoquist, 
and Sally Wallace).  This report discusses the tax gap in Georgia and options for 
increasing tax compliance.  FRC Report 133 (September 2006) 
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Four Easy Steps to a Fiscal Train Wreck:  The Florida How-To Guide (Richard 
Hawkins).  This report is the second of three reports that address the fiscal conditions 
of other states, explores the factors that explain the conditions, and the likely future 
trends.  FRC Report 132 (August 2006) 
 
The “Roller Coaster” of California State Budgeting After Proposition 13 (Robert 
Wassmer).  This report is the first of three reports that address the fiscal conditions 
of other states, explores the factors that explain the conditions, and the likely future 
trends.  FRC Report 131 (July 2006) 
 
Personal Property Tax on Motor Vehicles (Laura Wheeler, John Matthews and 
David L. Sjoquist).  This brief shows the expected reduction in the property tax base 
in each county if motor vehicles were tax exempt.  FRC Brief 130 (July 2006) 
 
Adequate Funding of Education in Georgia:  What Does It Mean, What Might It 
Cost, How Could It Be Implemented? (David L. Sjoquist and Abdullah Khan).  
This report contains a discussion of what adequate funding for education means and 
how it has been estimated for other states.  The report then explores the financial 
implications for Georgia of funding adequacy.  FRC Report/Brief 129 (May 2006) 
 
Legislative Influences on Performance-Based Budgeting Reform (Carolyn 
Bourdeaux).  Using data from several surveys of the states as well as a survey of 
Georgia state legislators, this report examines the role of legislators in the 
implementation of performance-based management and budgeting reforms.  FRC 
Report/Brief 128 (May 2006) 
 
A Georgia Fiscal History of the Past Forty Years (Richard Hawkins).  This report 
describes spending and revenue trends through four decades and relates the trends to 
the agendas of the state's governors.  It concludes with a list of challenges for this 
decade and beyond.  FRC Report/Brief 127 (April 2006) 
 
Gasoline Taxes in Georgia (Robert J. Eger III and William J. Smith).  This report 
describes and compares Georgia’s fuel tax with other states and evaluates it as a long-
term dedicated revenue source for highway funding in the state.  FRC Report/Brief 
126 (April 2006) 
 
A Historical Shift Share Analysis for  Georgia (Peter Bluestone). This report 
analyzes the trends in Georgia’s industrial composition and employment over the 
period 1970-2000 using shift share analysis.  FRC Report/Brief 125 (March 2006) 
 
The Demographics of Georgia III:  Lesbian and Gay Couples  (Gregory B. Lewis).  
Using 2000 Census data, this report compares the residential patterns, household 
incomes, house values, property taxes, and parenting patterns of Georgia’s same-sex 
and different-sex couples.  FRC Report/Brief 124  (March 2006) 
 
(All publications listed are available at http://frc.aysps.gsu.edu or call the Fiscal Research Center 
at 404/651-2782, or fax us at 404/651-2737.) 
